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THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND ITS
IMPACT ON AVIATION LITIGATION
ALAN H. COLLIER
NGLISH COMMON LAW encapsulated the theory of sover-
eign immunity in the familiar phrase "the King can do no
wrong." Since the King of England could do no wrong, he
could not be sued without his permission. However, we live in
the United States, where, for every wrong, there must be a
wrongdoer. When the wrongdoer happens to be the United
States government (our "King"), laws enacted by the Legislature
hold the government accountable for its wrongs. But what can
be done if a foreign "King" is the wrongdoer? Can a "King" who
"can do no wrong" in his own country be made to account for
wrongdoings associated with the United States? The ever-fluid
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")' seeks to answer
these questions. This article will delve into the history behind
the Act, trace its developments, and consider its impact on avia-
tion litigation in the United States.
I. HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT
In the 1812 case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, a
French warship known as the Balaou was forced to dock at the
Port of Philadelphia due to bad weather.2 While the ship was in
port, two United States citizens filed suit, claiming that the
Balaou was actually their commercial ship known as the
Schooner Exchange, which Napoleon had unlawfully seized and
converted into a battleship.' The Supreme Court dismissed the
suit on the ground that Napoleon could not be sued in a United
I Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-853, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 118 (1812). The facts of this case are not contained
in the opinion itself but are found in the prior history and arguments of counsel.
3 Id. at 117.
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States court.4 Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion began with
the proposition that "[t] he jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is suscepti-
ble of no limitation not imposed by itself."'5 In order to promote
friendly international relations, the United States impliedly re-
laxed its absolute jurisdiction, deciding that it would not enter-
tain suits against friendly ships owned by foreign sovereigns.6
Although the holding in The Schooner Exchange applied only to
the specific facts of the case, the "classical" or absolute theory of
foreign sovereign immunity emerged from Justice Marshall's
opinion and remained virtually unquestioned for over 100
years.7
Throughout the 1800's and early 1900's, the United States fol-
lowed the classical theory and virtually granted absolute immu-
nity from suit to foreign sovereigns in United States courts.'
This was done "as a matter of grace and comity," not because of
any constitutional impediment to allowing suits against foreign
sovereigns.9 From the time of The Schooner Exchange, the deci-
sion to grant sovereign immunity was a common law decision
made by the courts.10 However, in a 1943 case, the Supreme
Court granted sovereign immunity to the government of Peru
solely because the State Department requested immunity.1
Thereafter, the decision to grant sovereign immunity was defacto
made by the U.S. State Department, as the courts invariably de-
ferred to the State Department's decision on immunity.1 2
In 1952, in a letter from the Acting Legal Adviser of the De-
partment of State, Jack Tate, to the Acting Attorney General
(known as the "Tate letter"), the State Department departed
from the "classical" theory of foreign sovereign immunity and
adopted a "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity.1 3 As the
Tate letter explained:
4 Id. at 147.
5 Id. at 136.
6 Id. at 147.
7 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See generally The Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 116; Berizzi Bros. Co. v.
The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
11 Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
12 See, e.g., Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486; Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1943);
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States - A Proposal for Reform of United
States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 901, 903-05 (1969).
13 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698 (1976).
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According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immu-
nity, a sovereign cannot, without [its] consent, be made a respon-
dent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts
(jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis) 14
The Tate letter reasoned that since the United States govern-
ment allowed itself to be sued in United States courts, and even
in foreign courts if the suits concerned American ships, it was
inconsistent to continue granting absolute immunity to other
sovereigns in suits arising out of their commercial activities.15 In
addition, the increased involvement of foreign governments in
commercial activities made it necessary to create a forum where
the rights of parties doing business with foreign governments
could be determined.' 6
In practice, however, the restrictive theory announced in the
Tate letter proved difficult to apply.1 7 The letter did not define
"commercial" and "public" activities or specify who would deter-
mine which type of activity was involved.18 Furthermore, there
was no consistent method of acquiring jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns.19 As a result, the restrictive theory was inconsistently
applied, and foreign sovereign immunity was often granted or
denied based on political pressures or happenstance.2 °
In May 1976, the Supreme Court endorsed the restrictive the-
ory in Alfred Dunhill of London Inc., v. Cuba.21 This case arose
from the Cuban government's 1960 takeover of the five leading
manufacturers of Cuban cigars. 22 The new, government-in-
stalled management (called "interventors") continued export-
ing cigars to the United States using the same trademarks which
14 Id. at 711.
15 Id. at 714.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Lowenfield, supra note 12, at 907.
19 Id. at 902.
20 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487-88; Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3YALE STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD.
1, 2 (1976).
21 Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698-99. Alfred Dunhill was decided on May 24,
1976, about five months before the FSIA was enacted. Id. at 682. The FSIA was
enacted on October 21, 1976. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891.
22 Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 685.
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the former owners had used before the takeover.23 The cigar
companies' former owners fled to the United States, where they
sued the cigar importers for trademark infringement, claiming
that they, not the interventors, owned the trademarks on the
cigars. 24 The former owners also sued for the purchase price of
the cigars that had been shipped to the United States before the
takeover.25 The United States cigar importers, having already
paid the interventors for those same cigars, demanded that the
interventors refund the amounts mistakenly paid.26 Not surpris-
ingly, the interventors refused to do so. 27 The interventors
claimed that their refusal to pay was an "act of state" and not
subject to adjudication in United States courts. 2' The Supreme
Court disagreed. 29 The act of state doctrine to which the in-
terventors appealed arose from common law and prevents
United States courts from questioning the validity of a foreign
government's actions within its own territory20 This doctrine
did not allow the interventors to repudiate "purely commercial"
obligations without being subject to adjudication in United
States courts." The plurality based its reasoning on the restric-
23 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 686.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 690-91.
29 Id. at 691.
30 The act of state doctrine is a common law doctrine and not part of the FSIA.
However, the two are based on similar rationales - respect for the sovereignty of
foreign governments and avoiding embarrassment of the executive branch in its
conduct of foreign relations - and often interact with each other. See Alfred Dun-
hill, 425 U.S. at 697-700. While the FSIA is ajurisdictional statute, the act of state
doctrine is a choice of law rule. Unlike the FSIA, which exempts some defend-
ants from the jurisdiction of United States courts, "[t]he act of state doctrine
does not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass
foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the
acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed
valid." W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409
(1990). Therefore, an aviation entity which cannot defeat jurisdiction by claim-
ing sovereign immunity may assert the act of state doctrine as an affirmative de-
fense if the entity's conduct was compelled by a foreign government acting within
its own territory. See Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 549-
50 (1lth Cir. 1997).
31 Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695. Alfred Dunhill was a plurality opinion. While
the opinion is frequently cited, subsequent cases have questioned whether there
is a "commercial activity" exception to the act of state doctrine at all. See, e.g.,
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404-05.
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tive theory of sovereign immunity.12 The Court stated that the
restrictive theory was "generally accepted as the prevailing law"
in the United States.3 Under the restrictive theory, sovereign
immunity should be granted only for public or governmental
actions and not for commercial activities of a type that can also
be carried on by private citizens. 34 The Court concluded that
allowing the interventors to repudiate a commercial debt using
the act of state doctrine would be inconsistent with the restric-
tive approach to sovereign immunity and could not be
permitted. 5
Alfred Dunhill's discussion of the restrictive theory has been in-
strumental in defining the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA.36 For example, in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the Court held
that a foreign state's imprisonment and torture of an American
citizen, arising from his employment at a government-owned
hospital in Saudi Arabia, was not a "commercial activity" under
the FSIA.3 7 The Court reasoned that "commercial" must be
given the same meaning that Congress understood the restric-
tive theory to require when the FSIA was passed." The Court
looked to Alfred Dunhill's discussion of the restrictive theory and
determined that the restrictive theory would not permit suit on
these facts because imprisonment and torture are not activities
that can be carried on by private citizens.3 9 Therefore, suit
against Saudi Arabia was barred.4"
Four months after the Alfred Dunhill decision, in October
1976, the restrictive theory was finally codified as the FSIA.
41
32 See Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 701-06.
33 Id. at 703.
34 Id. at 704.
35 Id. at 705-06.
36 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 359-362 (1993) (holding that Saudi
Arabia's imprisonment and torture of an American citizen was not a "commercial
activity" under the FSIA because suit would not have been permitted under the
restrictive theory as described in Alfred Dunhill); Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S.
607, 607-08 (1992) (holding that issuing bonds was a "commercial activity" be-
cause any member of the public can issue bonds and therefore suit would have
been permitted under the restrictive theory as described in Alfred Dunhill); see also
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (a) (2) (2004) (pro-
viding a "commercial activity" exception to the FSIA).
37 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 362-63; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (defining "commer-
cial activity").
38 Id. at 359.
39 Id. at 360-62.
40 Id. at 363.
41 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW, RE-
VISED § 8.02, at 8-5 (2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1487 (1976)).
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The purpose of codification was to provide clear guidelines and
prevent future inconsistencies in the theory's application.42
Under the FSIA, the courts, not the State Department, are
called upon to utilize specific standards to determine whether
sovereign immunity will be granted in a particular case.
II. WHY IS THE FSIA IMPORTANT IN AVIATION CASES?
While aviation litigation does not usually include specifically
named foreign states, it is very common in aviation litigation to
find yourself in court with a foreign airport, airline, or aviation
manufacturer which could be deemed a foreign sovereign.
A. WHO IS A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN?
The FSIA is the only basis for subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign states.43 It grants sovereign immunity to all foreign
states, subject to a series of exceptions. 44 "Foreign state" is de-
fined to include the foreign states themselves, political subdivi-
sions of foreign states, and "agencies or instrumentalities" of
foreign states.45
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any
entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ...
nor created under the laws of any third country.
46
1. Foreign Sovereign Aviation Entities
Many airlines and some aviation manufacturers are consid-
ered to be agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states and, as
such, enjoy the protections of and are subject to the special pro-
visions of the FSIA. Frequently, airlines and aviation manufac-
turers qualify as agencies or instrumentalities because a majority
of their shares are owned by a foreign government. Airlines that
42 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
43 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443
(1989).
44 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2004).
45 Id. § 1603(a).
46 Id. § 1603(b)(1)-(3).
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have been found to be agencies or instrumentalities under the
FSIA include Saudi Arabia Airlines,47 Libyan Arab Airlines,48
Thai Airways International,49 South African Airways,5° Garuda
Indonesia (national airline of Indonesia),5a Surinam Airways,52
Aerlinte (Irish commercial air carrier), 5' Air France,54 Lot Po-
lish Airlines,55 Air Afrique,56 Austrian Airlines,57 Iberia Lineas
Aereas de Espana,58 Lufthansa German Airlines,59 and Gulf Air,
Inc.6" Aviation manufacturers that have been found to be agen-
cies or instrumentalities include Augusta S.P.A. and Siai
Marchetti (Italian aircraft manufacturers),61 Avions de Trans-
port Regional, G.I.E. (French and Italian owned aircraft manu-
facturer) ,62 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (French
helicopter manufacturer) ,63 Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aer-
onauticas, S.A. (Brazilian aircraft manufacturer) ,64 Societe Na-
tionale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation, S.A.
(French manufacturer of aircraft engines),65 and Airbus Indus-
trie GIE (French aircraft designer and manufacturer).66 In ad-
47 Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. v. Tamimi, 176 F.3d 274, 278 (4th Cir. 1999).
48 See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir.
1998).
49 Koirala v. Thai Airways Int'l, Ltd., 126 F.3d 1205, 1209 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997).
50 Brink's Ltd. v. S. African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.4 (2d Cir 1996).
51 Nysa-Ila Pension Trust Fund v. Garuda Indonesia, 7 F.3d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir.
1993).
52 In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 F.2d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992).
53 Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1989).
54 Chukwu v. Air France, 218 F. Supp. 2d 979, 983-84 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
55 Ryba v. Lot Polish Airlines, No. CIV. 5976, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2908, at *2-
3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001).
56 Uwazurike v. Air Afrique, No. 99-CV-541, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2855, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2000).
57 Brown v. Aus. Airlines, No. CV-97-3798, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21313, at *7
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1997).
58 Aguasviva v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, 937 F. Supp. 141, 142 (D.P.R.
1996).
59 Papapanos v. Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 94-2667-CIV-MARCUS, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9159, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 1995).
60 LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1988).
61 Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1082 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001).
62 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932,
939 (7th Cir. 1996).
63 Gould v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 40 F.3d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1994).
64 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Monroe, Mich. on Jan. 9, 1997, 987 F. Supp.
975, 979 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
65 Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1990).
66 Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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dition, entities such as the Nigerian Airport Authority,6 7 the
U.S.S.R. Ministry of Civil Aviation,68 and the European Organi-
sation for the Safety of Air Navigation (European equivalent of
the Federal Aviation Administration)69 have been considered
agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states, thus enjoying the
protections of the FSIA.
2. Pitfalls in the "Agency or Instrumentality" Determination:
Tiering, Pooling, and Timing
The language of the FSIA is extraordinarily confusing, and
determining whether an entity qualifies as an "agency or instru-
mentality" is not a straightforward task.7" Much of the confusion
has centered on whether ownership interests may be "tiered" or
"pooled" to achieve 50% ownership by a foreign sovereign. In
addition, there has been confusion as to what point in time an
entity's ownership structure should be considered when deter-
mining "agency or instrumentality" status.
a. Tiering
"Tiering" occurs when a foreign sovereign owns a majority in-
terest in a holding company or other intermediary entity, which
in turn owns a majority interest in the entity claiming sovereign
immunity. For example, South African Airways is 80% owned by
Transnet Ltd., which is controlled by South Africa's Minister for
Public Enterprises. 71 An entity with this type of ownership struc-
ture might reasonably be considered an agency or instrumental-
ity without departing from the purpose of the FSIA, and until
recently, a majority of the lower federal courts held that a
"tiered" ownership structure did not defeat a claim of sovereign
immunity.72 However, other courts have noted that a literal
67 Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 999 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir.
1993).
68 Filus v. Lot Polish Airlines, 939 F. Supp. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
69 EAL Corp. v. European Org. for the Safety of Air Navigation, No. 93-578-
SLR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20528, at *9-10 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 1994).
70 Courts frequently comment on the difficulty of interpreting the FSIA. One
court has characterized the statute as "vague and circuitous" and "user-un-
friendly." In reAir Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 909 F.
Supp. 1083, 1088 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
71 Musopole v. S. African Airways, Ltd., 172 F. Supp. 2d 443, 444 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
72 E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 932; Antoine v. Atlas
Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105 (6th Cir. 1995); Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v.
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reading of the FSIA does not permit tiering.7' For example, in
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, the Ninth Circuit held that entities
owned by foreign sovereigns though intermediaries are not
agencies or instrumentalities under the FSIA.7 1 The court rea-
soned that the FSIA states that an agency or instrumentality
must either: 1) be "an organ of a foreign state or political subdi-
vision thereof," or 2) have "a majority of its shares.., owned by
a 'foreign state or political subdivision thereof" (emphasis added).7
The statute does not say that entities which are majority owned
by agencies or instrumentalities are themselves agencies or
instrumentalities.76
In the case of Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, the Supreme Court
resolved this circuit split in favor of the Ninth Circuit position
and held that entities which are indirectly owned by a sovereign
government are not agencies or instrumentalities of that govern-
ment.77 This issue will be dealt with in greater detail in Part III
of this paper.
b. Pooling
"Pooling" occurs when two or more foreign states each indi-
vidually own less than 50% of an entity claiming sovereign im-
munity, but collectively own greater than 50% of such an entity.
For example, a majority of the shares of the now defunct airline
Air Afrique were owned by a consortium of eleven African states:
Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.78
However, none of these eleven states owned greater than 50% of
Air Afrique. 79 Two United States courts considered cases involv-
ing Air Afrique, and both permitted pooling of these states' in-
terests, granting the airline foreign sovereign status.8"
Additionally, other courts that have considered pooling have
Minimetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).




77 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 480 (2003).
78 Uwazurike v. Air Afrique, No. 99-CV-541, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2855, at *1-2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2000).
79 Ratnaswamy v. Air Afrique, No. 95-C-7670, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12899, at
*9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 1996).
8o Id. at *9-10.
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also permitted it."1 The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed this issue.
c. Combination of Tiering and Pooling
Entities have been permitted to employ both tiering and pool-
ing at the same time in order to achieve the required 50% own-
ership. For example, Avions de Transport, Regional, G.I.E.
("ATR"), one of the manufacturers of the ATR72-210 aircraft, is
approximately 75% owned by France and Italy (but less than
50% owned by each state) through a variety of double and triple
tiered intermediaries and holding companies.12 In In re Air
Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, the Sev-
enth Circuit discussed whether ATR could reasonably qualify for
foreign sovereign status notwithstanding its ownership struc-
ture.8" The court cited "the purpose and history" of the FSIA
and the legislative intent to define "foreign sovereign" broadly
in concluding that ATR was indeed an agency or instrumentality
of a foreign state.84
d. Timing
A third issue which affects whether an entity qualifies as an
agency or instrumentality is the point in time chosen in deter-
mining whether an entity is majority-owned by a foreign state.
Some courts have held that the relevant point in time is the
point when the acts that form the basis of the suit occurred. 5
These courts reasoned that " [t] he 'potential sensitivity of actions
against foreign states' is still a concern even after the majority of
the entity is no longer owned by a foreign state."8 6 In addition,
foreign entities should not have to worry about losing immunity
for past occurrences when planning for future reorganization., 7
Other courts, in non-aviation contexts, have held that the rele-
81 E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 932; Kern v. Jeppesen
Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1994); LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc.,
700 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D. Va. 1998).
82 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 935-36.
83 Id. at 937-41.
84 Id. at 938-40.
85 Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (8th Cir.
1993); In reAir Crash Disaster Near Monroe, Mich. On Jan. 9, 1997, 987 F. Supp.
975 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 530.
86 Kern, 867 F. Supp. at 530 (quoting Cargill Int'l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko,
991 F.2d 1012, 1016 (2d Cir. 1993)).
87 Id.
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vant time is the time of filing."8 The Supreme Court resolved
this issue in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, deciding that instrumen-
tality status is to be determined at the time the suit is filed. 9
This aspect of the Dole case will be discussed further in Part III.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The FSIA begins with a general grant of immunity to all for-
eign sovereigns, but then lists eight specific exceptions to immu-
nity.9" These exceptions are cases in which: 1) the foreign state
has explicitly or implicitly waived immunity; 2) suit is based on a
commercial activity of the foreign state; 3) property taken in vio-
lation of international law is at issue; 4) immovable property in
the United States is at issue; 5) damages were caused by the tor-
tious act or omission of the foreign state; 6) enforcement of an
arbitration agreement is sought; 7) money damages are sought
for personal injury or death caused by "an act of torture, extraju-
dicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision
of support or resources ... for such an act" (known as the state-
sponsored terrorism exception); or 8) suit is brought in admi-
ralty to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of a
foreign state.91 If one of the statutory exceptions applies, the
foreign sovereign becomes subject to suit in the United States
courts, but remains entitled to the FSIA procedural rules and
protections. These statutory protections are discussed in more
detail in Section II-C.
The commercial activity and state sponsored terrorism excep-
tions are the most relevant to aviation litigation. In a few cases,
the courts have found that a foreign sovereign defendant unwit-
tingly waived its immunity.9 2 The remaining five exceptions are
very seldom used in aviation litigation.
1. Commercial Activity
Of the eight enumerated exceptions, the "commercial activ-
ity" exception is by far the most commonly employed in aviation
litigation. This exception permits foreign sovereigns to be sued
if the suit is "based upon" any of three situations: (1) "a com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign
88 E.g., Straub v. A.P. Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994).
89 Dole, 538 U.S. at 478.
90 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)-(b) (2004).
91 Id.
92 Coyle v. Garuda Indon., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 (D. Or. 2001).
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state"; (2) "an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere"; or (3)
"an act outside the territory of the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere that
causes a direct effect in the United States. 93
A foreign sovereign engages in "commercial activity" when it
exercises powers that can also be exercised by private citizens
acting in the marketplace. 4 A suit is "based upon" an act if that
activity establishes the "elements of a claim that, if proven,
would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case. 9 5
In other words, "based upon" means that the activity specified in
the statute must be necessary to establish an element of the
plaintiffs case. Simply conducting business in the United States
on a regular basis will not satisfy the commercial activity require-
ment.9 6 Although a foreign sovereign has the burden of plead-
ing foreign sovereign status and refuting a plaintiffs assertion
that an exception applies, in many aviation cases, the courts
have simply assumed, without discussion, that the commercial
activity exception applies and allowed the suit to proceed.97
2. State-Sponsored Terrorism
One noteworthy though less frequently used exception in-
volves suits arising out of acts of state-sponsored terrorism. This
exception was added to the statute in 1996 in response to
Libya's involvement in the 1988 bombing of Pan American Air-
lines Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland." It provides that for-
eign sovereigns are not immune from suit in United States
courts for money damages due to personal injury or death
caused by "act[s] of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabo-
tage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or re-
sources ... for such an act" if the defendant is designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism and the victims were United States
citizens.99 During the last four years, this amendment has made
several high profile aviation lawsuits possible. In 1998, the survi-
93 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2).
94 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 360; Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Honduras, 129 F.3d
543, 547 (1lth Cir. 1997).
95 Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357.
96 Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. v. Tamimi, 176 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1999).
97 See, e.g., Brinks, Ltd. v. S. African Airways, 93 F.3d 1022, 1026-27 (2d Cir.
1996); In reAir Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932,
936 (7th Cir. 1996).
98 KREINDLER, supra note 41, § 8.05 [4] [a], at 8-41.
91 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (2004).
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vors and representatives of those killed in the crash of Pan
American Flight 103 sued the government of Libya for wrongful
death.100 Libya was also sued for indemnification by an insur-
ance company that paid $485 million in claims arising from the
Pan American Flight 103 bombing.1"1 In 2002, a $330 million
judgment was entered against The Islamic Republic of Iran and
its Ministry of Information and Security for damages resulting
from the hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847 in 1985.102
Most recently, the representatives of two victims of the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 World Trade Center attack sued and obtained a
judgment against the government of Iraq.10 3
While enticing to plaintiffs as a means of receiving compensa-
tion and punishing the wrongdoer in an aviation disaster, the
ability to actually collect damages in such a suit has been histori-
cally questionable at best.10 4 In an interesting twist, recent de-
velopments in the Pan American Flight 103 bombing case are
providing a glimmer of hope that plaintiffs may actually collect
damages from a foreign state wrongdoer. In May of 2002, a
Plaintiffs' Committee, comprised of the victims' attorneys, met
in Paris with a Libyan team to negotiate a settlement to compen-
sate the victims of Flight 103.105 The Libyan government agreed
to accept responsibility for the accident and provide compensa-
tion in the amount of $2.7 billion to be divided equally among
the plaintiffs in exchange for a lift of sanctions imposed by the
United Nations and United States. 10 6 The offer's installment na-
ture is unusual: 40% of the money to be disbursed once the
United Nations lifts sanctions against Libya; another 40% to be
paid when the U.S. trade sanctions, including a 1986 embargo,
are lifted; and the remaining 20% to be paid to families once
the United States removes Libya from a list of seven terrorist-
100 Rein, 162 F.3d at 753.
10, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, No. 98-
3096, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15035, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 1999).
102 Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 93 (D.D.C. 2002).
103 Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
104 Molora Vadnais, Comment, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act: Forward Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J. INT'L. L. &
FOREIGN Arr. 199, 205-06 (2000); Sean P. Vitrano, Comment, Hell-Bent on Award-
ing Recovery to Terrorism Victims: The Evolution and Application of the Antiterrorism
Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 213, 222-23
(2000).
105 Barbara Slavin, Libya to Compensate Pan Am 103 Families, USATODAY.com, at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002/05/28/libya.htm (May 29, 2001).
106 Id.
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sponsoring states."°7 In August 2003, Libya delivered a letter to
the United Nations accepting responsibility for the bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103,08 and in September 2003, the United Na-
tions voted 13-0 to lift its sanctions against Libya.10 9
With the United Nations' lifting the sanctions, the first 40% of
the $2.7 billion is on the way to the victims of the Pan Am bomb-
ing, but it should be noted that this is an extremely unusual
situation and plaintiffs should not expect other foreign nations
to accept responsibility for terrorist actions and agree to pay
compensation. It is significant that Libya, which earns $14 bil-
lion a year from oil exports, was in a particularly good financial
position to agree to a settlement of such proportions.1 0 Al-
though a settlement of this magnitude is ground-breaking, it not
yet clear how much of an impact Libya's actions will have on
other foreign sovereigns that are brought into United States
courts under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the
FSLA.
C. THE IMPACT OF A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN DEFENDANT
ON YOUR CASE
If suit is permitted against a foreign sovereign defendant pur-
suant to one of the eight statutory exceptions, the FSIA provides
special procedural rules and important protections for the for-
eign sovereign defendant. These rules can dramatically impact
a plaintiffs or co-defendant's case and must be fully considered
in order to properly analyze an aviation case.
1. Federal Court Jurisdiction
The federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any
action against a foreign sovereign which falls within one of the
FSIA exceptions.1 1' As such, a foreign sovereign defendant has
the absolute right to remove any action brought in state court to
the federal district court embracing the venue where the suit
was brought. 12 Removal is proper even if the foreign sovereign
107 Id.
108 Elise Labott, U.S.: Libya Takes Lockerbie Blame, CNN.com, at http://cn-
nusnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&expire= l&url 1ID=722931
109 Richard Roth & Liz Neisloss, U.N. Votes to Lift Libya Sanctions, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/africa/09/12/libya.france/index.html
(Sept. 23, 2003).
110 Slavin, supra note 105.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2004).
112 Id. § 1441(d).
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is a third party defendant. 13 In addition, all related claims,
even against non-FSIA defendants, can be removed as pendant
to the FSIAjurisdiction. 114 As federal court jurisdiction is gener-
ally a goal of aviation defendants, being sued with a foreign sov-
ereign may initially be seen as an advantage. In some cases, it
could motivate an interested defendant to implead a foreign
sovereign in order to ensure otherwise questionable federal
jurisdiction.
2. No Jury Trials or Default Judgments
Suits against FSIA defendants are tried to the court without a
jury. 5 The policy behind this rule is to protect foreign sover-
eigns from the potential biases and prejudices of ordinary
United States citizens. If there are multiple defendants and the
plaintiff is entitled to a jury as to the non-FSIA defendants, the
court may choose to conduct parallel bench/jury trials, 16 with
the jury rendering only an advisory verdict as to the FSIA de-
fendants. 7 While the lack of a jury is generally considered to
be a benefit to the defendant in an aviation case, a parallel
bench/jury trial creates potential difficulties for all parties. The
risk of a parallel bench/jury trial is a conflict between the
court's findings regarding the foreign sovereign and the jury's
findings regarding non-sovereign defendants. This can become
increasingly complicated in jurisdictions with unique compara-
tive fault provisions. For example, California's Proposition 51
imposes 'joint" liability on defendants for "economic" or "spe-
cial" damages, but only "several" liability for "general" or "non-
economic" damages. 1 Imagine a scenario where the court
finds a foreign sovereign defendant 75% at fault, and the jury
finds the non-sovereign defendant 75% at fault. Or, imagine if
the court absolves the foreign sovereign of liability, finds non-
foreign sovereign defendant "A" 95% at fault, and finds non-
foreign sovereign defendant "B" 5% at fault, while the jury does
the opposite and absolves non-foreign sovereign defendant "A"
of liability, finds the foreign sovereign 95% at fault, and finds
113 In reAir Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. On Oct. 31, 1994, 909 F. Supp.
1083, 1089-90 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
114 Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1064-66 (5th Cir. 1990); In reAir Crash
Disaster Near Roselawn, 909 F.3d at 1103.
115 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d).
116 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. at 1113-14; Williams v. Aer
Lingus Irish Airlines, 655 F. Supp. 425, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
117 Williams, 655 F. Supp. at 426.
11s CAL. Crv. CODE § 1431.2 (2004).
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non-foreign sovereign defendant "B" 5% at fault. Does defen-
dant "B" pay 100% of the economic damages?
If the jury renders an advisory verdict as to a non-foreign sov-
ereign defendant, there is also a risk that the judge might simply
accept the jury's advisory verdict simply to avoid conflicting ver-
dicts. These problems could be avoided by bifurcating the trial,
but this seems relatively uncommon, likely due to the increased
judicial time and expense and the increasingly crowded federal
courts.
Furthermore, the court may not enter a default judgment
against an FSIA defendant. The plaintiff must always show a
"claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the
[c]ourt."119 Consequently, a plaintiff may have to put on a case
without any discovery and without any appearance by the defen-
dant. For example, in Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,
plaintiffs put on a case that Saddam Hussein and Iraq were in-
volved in, and thus liable for, the September 11, 2001 World
Trade Center attack.1 2' No defense was presented. At the con-
clusion of the evidence, the court concluded that "plaintiffs
have shown, albeit barely, 'by evidence satisfactory to the court'
that Iraq provided material support to bin Laden and al
Qaeda. '1 21 Therefore, judgment was entered for the plaintiffs.
3. Damages
The right to and ability to collect damages is also limited as to
foreign sovereigns. The FSIA provides that foreign sovereign
defendants "shall be liable in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances. ' 122 How-
ever, punitive damages are generally not available against FSIA
defendants. 123 In addition, most non-commercial property
owned by the foreign state is immune from attachment to satisfy
a judgment.1 24 Commercial property may be attached under
certain circumstances, 125 but the statutory language is especially
convoluted as to when attachment is permitted.
The 1996 and 1998 terrorism amendments established excep-
tions to these damages rules for suits brought under the state-
119 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).
120 Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
121 Id. at 232.
122 28 U.S.C. § 1606.
123 Id.
124 Id. §§ 1609, 1610(a)-(b).
125 Id. §§ 1610-1611.
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sponsored terrorism exception. A note attached to 28 U.S.C.§ 1605(a) (7) states that, in actions brought under that amend-
ment, punitive damages may be assessed against agencies or in-
strumentalities of foreign sovereigns. 126  Pursuant to this
amendment, a $137 million punitive damage judgment has
been entered against the Cuban Air Force,127 and a $300 million
punitive damage judgment has been entered against the Iranian
Ministry of Information and Security.128 In addition, the non-
commercial assets of state sponsors of terrorism, including dip-
lomatic assets, generally may be attached to satisfy judgments. 129
Furthermore, the statute provides that the Secretary of State and
Secretary of the Treasury should assist plaintiffs that have ob-
tained judgments under the state-sponsored terrorism excep-
tion in locating and executing against the foreign state's
property,130 although the President of the United States may
waive this provision in the interests of national security. 3' The
President has chosen to waive this provision repeatedly, making
it difficult, if not impossible, to collect these damages. 13 2
4. Service of Process
Subject matter jurisdiction plus correct service of process cre-
ates personal jurisdiction over foreign sovereign defendants.
Procedures for service upon foreign sovereign defendants are
specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1608. There are two sets of service re-
quirements. One applies to foreign states and their political
subdivisions; the other applies to agencies or instrumentali-
ties.13 In addition, "foreign state" and "agency or instrumental-
ity" are defined differently for service purposes than they are in
the rest of the FSIA.13 ' For service purposes, if the entity is a
separate legal person and its primary functions are governmen-
126 See id. § 1605(a) (7); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 25-26
(D.D.C. 1998). This provision, commonly known as the Flatow amendment, was
added in response to the death of American student Alisa Flatow who was killed
in a suicide bombing in Israel. KREINDLER, supra note 41 § 8.05[4] [b], at 8-46.
127 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
128 Stethem v. Islamic Republis of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 93 (D.D.C. 2002).
129 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7), (b)(2), (f).
130 Id. § 1610(f) (2) (A).
131 Id. § 1610(f) (3).
132 Vadnais, supra note 104, at 214 (citing Flatow, 999 F. Supp. 1 and Alejandre
v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997)).
133 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)-(b) (2004).
134 See id. § 1603(a) ("A 'foreign state,' except as used in section 1608 of this title,
includes ....") (emphasis added).
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tal rather than commercial, it is served as a foreign state.1"5 En-
tities which do not have core governmental functions are served
as agencies or instrumentalities. 136
Very specific service procedures for foreign states are set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a).137 Improper service on a foreign state is
rarely excused and results in dismissal of the suit even if actual
service was accomplished. 138 Service procedures for agencies or
instrumentalities are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b).1 39 Most
air carriers and manufacturers are properly served using the
procedures of § 1608(b).1 40
5. Choice of Law
Courts are currently divided as to which choice of law rules
govern FSIA actions.14 1 Some courts use federal common law
choice of law rules to determine what substantive law applies,
while others use the forum state's choice of law rules. 142
Federal common law uses the choice of law rules of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 143 Under the Restate-
ment (Second) approach, the substantive law of the place of the
wrong presumptively applies, unless another place has a more
significant relationship with the case. 144 Therefore, in these
courts, if an accident occurs in Poland, the substantive law of
Poland will apply as long as it will not lead to an "unjust" or
"anachronistic" result.'4 5
Other courts apply the forum state's choice of law rules. 146
The rationale for this approach is that foreign sovereign defend-
ants are to be liable "in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances." '47 If all the
135 Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151-52 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
136 Id.
137 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a).
138 Transaero, 30 F.3d at 154.
139 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b).
140 KREINDLER, supra note 41, § 8.07[2], at 8-49.
141 Vargas v. Air Fr. Freighter, No. 02-C-5912, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4524, at
*5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2003).
142 Id.
143 Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1992); Harris
v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1987).
144 Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, 930 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 1991); Har-
ris, 820 F.2d at 1003-04.
145 Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 641 F. Supp. 94, 99 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
146 Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation, 923 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1991).
147 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2004).
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parties to the suit were private, the forum state's choice of law
rules would apply. Under this approach, the substantive law that
applies depends on each state's individual choice of law rules.
State choice of law rules tend to favor applying that state's sub-
stantive law.
Although in some cases both choice of law rules will lead to
the same result,14 this split in the circuits could lead to forum
shopping. When the wrong arguably occurred outside the
United States, defense counsel may prefer a court that applies
the Restatement (Second) choice of law analysis. Under the Re-
statement (Second) analysis, the substantive law of the place of
the wrong will probably control. Many foreign countries place
more limits on plaintiff recoveries than the United States does,
and consequently, application of a foreign country's substantive
law is a very attractive defense option. Conversely, plaintiffs'
counsel are likely to prefer a court that applies the forum state's
choice of law rules, where it is more likely that the substantive
law of the forum state, not a foreign country, will apply.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: DOLE FOOD
CO. V. PATRICKSON
The Supreme Court handed down Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,
in April 2003.149 Although not an aviation case, Dole will have a
significant effect on airlines, aircraft manufacturers, and other
aviation entities' ability to claim foreign sovereign status. Dole
addressed the "tiering" and "timing" problems with the agency
or instrumentality definition discussed earlier. 5 ° The Court re-
solved both of these issues in ways that restrict the number of
aviation entities that will be granted agency or instrumentality
status.
A. THE DECISION
In Dole, plaintiffs, a group of farm workers, sued Dole Food
Company in state court claiming injury from exposure to an ag-
ricultural pesticide. 151 Dole impleaded Dead Sea Bromine Co.,
Ltd. and Bromine Compounds, Ltd. (collectively the Dead Sea
Companies). 5 2 The Dead Sea Companies removed the case to
148 Vargas, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4524, at *6.
149 Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
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federal court and claimed that removal was proper under the
FSIA because they were agencies or instrumentalities of the state
of Israel. 153 The Dead Sea Companies actually had a tiered own-
ership structure.154 At the time of the wrong, the state of Israel
was the sole owner of Israeli Chemicals, which owned a majority
interest in Dead Sea Works, which owned a majority interest in
Dead Sea Bromine and its subsidiary, Bromine Compounds.155
Following Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, which strictly applied the
FSIA and did not permit tiering, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
order allowing removal.156
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer
two questions: 1) can a corporate subsidiary claim agency or in-
strumentality status when it is indirectly owned by a foreign
state; and 2) when is the relevant time period for determining
agency or instrumentality status?1 57
The Supreme Court held that the Dead Sea Companies were
not agencies or instrumentalities because only a foreign state's
direct ownership of a majority of shares satisfies the statutory re-
quirement for agency or instrumentality status. 158 The Court ex-
plained that since Congress used the word "shares" in the
statute, Congress must have intended for the statute to be inter-
preted with reference to formal corporate ownership struc-
tures.1 59 A basic principle of corporate law is that a corporation
and its shareholders are separate and distinct entities. Since
corporations and their shareholders are not treated as the same
entity, the court reasoned that Dead Sea Works' ownership of a
majority of the shares in the Dead Sea Companies could not be
attributed to Israel. Furthermore, the court interpreted the stat-
ute's reference to "other ownership interest" as not including
tiered ownership structures because that phrase directly follows
the statute's reference to "shares." Because of this placement,
"other ownership interest" must mean interest other than stock
ownership.
The Court also held that agency or instrumentality status must
be determined based on the facts that exist when suit is filed,
153 Id. at 472.
154 Id. at 473.
155 Id. at 473-74.
156 Id. at 472.
157 Id. at 471.
158 Id. at 474.
159 Id.
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not the facts that existed when the wrong occurred. 160 The
Court reasoned simply that the statute is written in the present
tense and a plain reading of the text required a finding that
instrumentality status is determined at the time of the filing of
the complaint.1 61
B. THE IMPACT OF DOLE
1. What Entities Will Lose Their Sovereign Immunity?
Following the Dole decision, a number of significant aviation
entities that are indirectly owned by foreign states will no longer
be protected by foreign sovereign status when they are sued in
United States courts. Case law indicates that South African Air-
ways162 and Aerolineas Argentinas,1 63 for example, are, or have
been indirectly owned by their respective governments through
a tiered ownership structure. Foreign state owned manufactur-
ers such as Avions de Transport Regional, G.I.E., 64 Airbus,' 65
and Augusta S.P.A., 166 also have, or have had tiered ownership
structures. In addition, since much FSIA case law has, until now,
simply stated that an entity is an agency or instrumentality with-
out giving information about that entity's ownership struc-
ture,1 67 it is quite possible that many foreign government
controlled aviation entities also have tiered ownership structures
which are not apparent in the case law.
2. Effects on the Litigation Process
The practical effects of entities losing their foreign sovereign
status as a result of Dole are far reaching.
160 Id. at 478.
161 Id.
162 Brink's Ltd. v. S. Afr. Airways, 93 F.3d 1022 (2d Cir. 1996).
163 Gardiner Stone Hunter Int'l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas De Espana, S.A., 896 F.
Supp. 125, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
164 In reAir Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. On Oct. 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932,
935 (7th Cir. 1996).
165 Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 794 F. Supp. 650, 652 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
166 Trump Taj Mahal Assocs. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta,
S.p.A., 761 F. Supp. 1143, 1149 (D.N.J. 1991).
167 E.g., Vargas, 2003 U.S. Dist. 4524, at *5; Coyle v. Garuda Indon., 180 F.
Supp. 2d 1160, 1162 (D. Or. 2001); Four Corners Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomeca
S.A., 677 F. Supp. 1096, 1097 (D. Colo. 1988).
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a. Jury Trials
As foreign-sovereign status is a necessity for an entity to re-
ceive any of the benefits of the FSIA, certain entities are now
deprived of the FSIA's requirement that such defendants be sub-
ject only to bench trials.
Foreign-owned defendants who previously were not subject to
trial by American juries now must face the uncertainty, subjectiv-
ity, and potential hostility inherent in the United States jury sys-
tem. Being subject to an American jury trial instead of a bench
trial is generally accepted as tantamount to increased exposure
to liability. In addition, since the entire litigation process looks
toward trial, and a jury trial is dramatically different from a
bench trial, both plaintiff and defense litigation strategies will
have to change.
b. Punitive Damages
Similarly, defendants that were previously immune from puni-
tive damages will no longer enjoy that immunity. The availabil-
ity of punitive damages may shift the focus of discovery away
from proving compensatory damages and towards finding evi-
dence that the defendant possessed the mental state or knowl-
edge required before punitive damages can be imposed. This
search for evidence to support a punitive damage award can be
time-consuming and can dramatically increase discovery costs.
c. Federal v. State Court Jurisdiction Over Cases
Dole will also have a dramatic impact on the ability of federal
courts to assert jurisdiction over entire cases, not just isolated
defendants. Aviation litigation frequently involves multiple de-
fendants including an airline, the manufacturer of the aircraft
and its component parts, the pilot, and others. Often some of
the defendants will have an independent basis for removal to
federal court, but others will not. However, if just one of these
parties is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, then
the federal district courts have pendant jurisdiction over the en-
tire case.16 This keeps the case together, saving judicial time,
facilitating coordinated discovery, and ensuring that plaintiffs
do not have to go to trial in multiple courts.
168 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2004); Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 1064-66
(5th Cir. 1990); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, 909 F. Supp. at 1103;
Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
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Following Dole, some defendants that provided the basis for
removing a case pursuant to the FSIA have lost their foreign
sovereign status. These cases will literally fall apart: the no-
longer-foreign-sovereign defendant will be remanded to state
court, dragging with them other defendants who tagged along
to federal court on the FSIA bandwagon. Complex aviation liti-
gation involving multiple plaintiffs and defendants will have to
proceed with one piece of the litigation in state court and an-
other piece in federal court once the common right to remove
under FSIA is eliminated.
This complexity is seen in the current SQ006 litigation arising
out of the crash of a Singapore Airlines 747 on the runway of
Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport in Taipei, Taiwan, which
killed 79 passengers and 4 crew members.169 All of the United
States cases arising from this crash were centralized into multi-
district litigation ("MDL") before Judge Feess in United States
District Court in Los Angeles.' 7° The majority of the cases in
this litigation were properly in federal court pursuant to the
169 Although not directly related to the FSIA, an interesting development in-
volving Singapore's State Immunity Act (Cap 313, 1985 Rev. Ed.) (the "Act") has
also arisen in the Singapore Airlines SQ006 litigation. In Woo v. Singapore Airlines
Ltd. [2003] SGHC 190, a related case before a Singapore court, defendant Singa-
pore Airlines joined the Civil Aeronautics Administration ("CAA") as a third
party to the suit. Id. at 689. As a department of the Taiwanese government, the
CAA claimed immunity under the State Immunity Act and argued that the third
party proceedings must therefore be set aside. Id. at 689-90. However, the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs refused to issue a certificate indicating that Taiwan was a
"state" under the State Immunity Act. Id. at 691. Despite the fact that the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs did not officially recognize Taiwan as a "state" under the
State Immunity Act, the CAA claimed that it could still be recognized as such
through defacto recognition. Id. The CAA also argued that if Singapore did not
recognize Taiwan as a "state," then Taiwan was not subject to suit in Singapore
courts. Id. at 693. The court held that the Ministry's refusal to issue a certificate
of official recognition meant that Taiwan is not a state, either de jure or de facto,
for purposes of the Act. Id. at 692-93. As to CAA's alternative grounds, the court
held that
The incongruous situation of having an entity that looks like a
state, behaves like a state, is treated like a state, and yet not be rec-
ognized by a court of law as a state, is ... the lesser contradiction.
It is a greater contradiction to have an entity given immunity when
its existence is recognized dejure or defacto, and also when it is not
recognized at all."
Id. at 696. As such, "any entity that purports to be a state or government of a state
that is not recognized [either] de jure or de facto does not enjoy immunity from
suit." Id.
170 In reAir Crash at Taipei, Taiwan, on Oct. 13, 2000, No. 1394, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5232, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Apr. 18, 2001).
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Warsaw Convention.171 However, due to the uncertainty of War-
saw jurisdiction in some cases, Singapore Airlines alternatively
removed cases based upon its status as an "agency or instrumen-
tality" of a foreign sovereign. 172 Co-defendants Boeing and
Goodrich Corporation joined in these removals.' 73
Almost a year later, but prior to the Dole decision, Judge Feess
found that the Republic of Singapore's indirect, or tiered, own-
ership of Singapore Airlines through a holding company meant
that the airline was not an "agency or instrumentality" of the
Republic of Singapore.17 4 The court based this decision on
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, which disallowed foreign sovereign sta-
tus on the basis of tiered ownership structure. 75
Consequently, in the non-Warsaw cases, removal became im-
proper. 176 The non-Warsaw cases against Singapore Airlines
were thus remanded to California Superior Court, leaving the
Warsaw cases in federal district court. 77 To complicate matters
further, the court found a lack of Warsaw treaty jurisdiction in
certain cases and dismissed Singapore Airlines from the federal
district court MDL action entirely, leaving defendants Boeing
and Goodrich in federal court. 7 1 In these cases now pending
only against the manufacturing defendants, which had been ini-
tially removed pursuant to Warsaw and FSIA jurisdiction (both
now gone), Judge Feess decided to retain jurisdiction because
complete diversity had been created by the elimination of the
foreign defendant. 71
The SQ006 litigation clearly illustrates Dole's far reaching im-
pact. Dole placed the plaintiffs in a much better position vis-a-vis
Singapore Airlines. However, the United States cases must now
171 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 139 LN.
T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2004) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]
172 In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan On Oct. 13, 2000, No. MDL 1394 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 4, 2002) (order remanding action to state court for lack ofjurisdiction)
(not published).
173 Id.




178 In reAir Crash at Taipei, Taiwan, on October 13, 2000, No. MDL 1394, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27430, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2002).
179 Id. The court cited 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (3) and Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519
U.S. 61, 72-75 (1996) (upholding a denial of a motion to remand, where, al-
though complete diversity did not exist at the beginning of a case, it existed at
the case's conclusion). Id.
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proceed in two courts, consuming additional judicial time and
resources and increasing plaintiffs' litigation costs. The same
thing will likely happen in other cases. In addition, this teaches
defense counsel that when removing to federal court on the ba-
sis of a client's agency or instrumentality status, counsel should
also remove on alternative grounds, if available.
d. Co-defendant Conflicts
Following Dole, closely related co-defendants that previously
would have shared common interests and a perhaps even a com-
mon defense may have very different interests and require dif-
ferent defense strategies. For example, a foreign state might
directly own a majority of the stock in a national airline, which
in turn might wholly own a subsidiary which maintains the air-
planes. A situation similar to this occurred in America West Air-
lines, Inc. v. GPA Group. ° Post Dole, if one of the airline's planes
is involved in an accident and both the airline and the mainte-
nance subsidiary are sued, the airline will be protected by the
FSIA, but the maintenance subsidiary will not be protected. In
addition, the claims against the airline and the maintenance
subsidiary will likely be adjudicated in different courts, leading
to the potential for double liability or the opportunity for each
entity to point fingers at the other. Furthermore, since these
defendants will be unable to launch a coordinated defense, costs
of defending these claims will increase.
e. Potential Shift in Argument
As aviation entities view Dole as taking away the protections of
FSIA, we may see a shift in argument under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(b) (2) from the nature of the ownership structure to sta-
tus as an "organ" of a foreign state.
In a non-aviation case arising out of an insurance company
majority owned by Ireland, but which had post-Dole ownership
problems due to tiering, the company amended its Notice of Re-
moval to allege that it was, in fact, and "organ" or Ireland under
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2).181 In response to this argument, the
Third Circuit approved 7 factors to consider (6 of which were
from the 5th and 9th Circuits) in considering whether an entity
was an "organ" of a foreign state.
The factors are as follows:
180 Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1989).
181 USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190 (3rd Cir. 2003).
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(1) the circumstances surrounding the entity's creation;
(2) the purpose of its activities;
(3) the degree of supervision by the government;
(4) the level of government financial support;
(5) the entity's employment policies, particularly regarding
whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public em-
ployees and pays their salaries;
(6) the entities obligations and privileges under the foreign
state's laws [and]
(7) the ownership structure of the entity.18 2
If these factors are met and an entity can fall within the "organ"
prong of 1603(b) (2), then the post-Dole majority ownership
problems may potentially be avoided. "Organ" has yet to be
clearly defined in an aviation context. 8 '
IV. CONCLUSION
Aviation counsel involved in U.S. litigation must consider the
impact of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and must be
constantly aware of the status of each defendant. The presence
of a foreign sovereign defendant in a case can dramatically
change how the litigation is handled.
Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson changes aviation litigation by re-
stricting the aviation entities that may claim foreign sovereign
status. Some of Dole's effects have been outlined here. Others
will come to light as cases like the SQ006 litigation progress.
Still others may not become apparent until formerly foreign
sovereign entities have faced American juries and incurred puni-
tive damage awards. Between Dole's dramatic impact onjurisdic-
tion over currently pending cases and the uncertainty as to its
precise long term effects, it is clear that both plaintiff and de-
fense litigation strategies must evolve in light of this important
decision.
182 Id. at 209.
183 In an effort to avoid the consequences of Dole in an aviation context, China
Airlines argued that its majority owner is a "political subdivision" rather than an
"agency or instrumentality" of the People's Republic of China in Wong v. Boeing
Co., No. 02 C 7865, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15685 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2003). If
successful, this would eliminate one of the ownership "tiers" and the airline
would qualify as an "agency or instrumentality. This argument was rejected by a
District Court judge in Chicago. Id.
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